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Introduction
Imagine that police officers arrest Robert White after an informant
bought an ounce of cocaine from him. While searching Robert
incident to his arrest, the police find his smart phone. 1 In order to
determine if Robert is working with any conspirators to sell the
cocaine, the officers decide to search the contents of his phone, and
come across photographs implicating him in a child pornography ring.
Before trial on the charges of possession and distribution of child
pornography, Robert moves to suppress the evidence found on his cell
phone 2 because officers searched it without a warrant. 3
1.

For a definition and brief history of “smartphones,” see William L. Hosch,
Smartphone, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/1498102/smartphone (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).

2.

This Comment uses the term smart phone to specify the modern cell
phones defined by Encyclopedia Britannica. Id. When this Comment
discusses cell phones, the term encompasses both smart phones and
traditional cell phones, which simply send text messages and make
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The above situation has become more common due to the
heightened prevalence of smart phones in the United States. 4 As such,
courts have increasingly been required to determine the legality and
parameters of cell phone searches—often coming to vastly different
outcomes. 5 Without proper guidance from courts, officers struggle to
determine whether they may search, when they may search, and what
information on the phone they may search. This Comment proposes a
workable standard that should be uniformly followed by courts in
order to provide guidance to officers as to when they may properly
search a smart phone incident to arrest. Part I studies the history of
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.
Part II surveys the different pathways lower courts used when
analyzing cell phone searches. Part III examines two recent Supreme
Court cases’ effect on the search of smart phones. Part IV defines the
standard all courts should apply—and officers should follow—in
determining if a search of a smart phone is lawful under current
Supreme Court precedent. Overall, this Comment concludes that the
reasoning set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision of Arizona v. Gant
protects a smart phone from being searched incident to every arrest. 6

I.

History of the Search Incident to Arrest Exception

The Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”7
Although the Supreme Court has often stated that warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable, 8 the Court has created many
phone calls without the additional capabilities of a smart phone. The
discussion of prior case law, in Part II, is an exception to this rule since
many courts did not distinguish if the cell phone at issue was a smart
phone or not.
3.

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable).

4.

See Two Thirds of New Mobile Buyers Now Opting For Smartphones,
Nielsen (July 12, 2012), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_
mobile/two-thirds-of-new-mobile-buyers-now-opting-for-smartphones
(depicting the substantial growth of smart phones in the market).

5.

See infra Part II.

6.

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).

7.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

8.

See, e.g., Gant, 556 U.S. at 338 (stating that “searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment”
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357)); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 401
(1985) (same).
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exceptions. 9 Each court to confront the issue of a warrantless cell
phone search has analyzed the issue utilizing a different framework
under the search incident to arrest theory of warrantless searches.
The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement,
which has developed through several Supreme Court opinions, permits
officers to search a person and his effects upon valid arrest in order to
protect police and to find evidence to use for prosecution. As early as
1914, the Supreme Court, in dicta, authorized officers “to search the
person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the
fruits or evidences of crime.” 10 Several years later, the Court
elaborated on this permission and stated that “[w]hen a man is legally
arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his
control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used
to prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the
prosecution.” 11 Only a few months later, the Court, again in dicta,
stated that officers may search the place where a lawful arrest is made
in order to search for evidence and weapons, 12 and this was later used
to uphold the search of a closet pursuant to a lawful arrest. 13 In the
years following the expansion of this policy, the Court swayed
between permitting full searches of the premises where an arrest
occurs and invalidating such searches. 14
9.

See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (“It is well
established that under certain circumstances the police may seize
evidence in plain view without a warrant.” (quoting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971))); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (“[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed . . .
as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store,
dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official
warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat,
wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.”).

10.

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).

11.

Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392).

12.

Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (“The right without a
search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested
while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made
in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or
as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other
things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.”).

13.

See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (“They had a
right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order
to find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal enterprise. . . .
The closet in which liquor and the ledger were found was used as a part
of the saloon.”).

14.

Compare Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358
(1931) (invalidating a search of the arrestee’s office), and United States
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Finally, in 1969, the Court, in Chimel v. California, clarified its
position on what searches an officer is permitted to conduct incident
to arrest. 15 In 1965, officers arrested Chimel pursuant to a warrant for
burglary of a coin shop. 16 Upon execution of the arrest warrant, the
officers sought permission to search his house, which Chimel refused. 17
Officers proceeded to search his entire home anyway, on the basis of
the lawful arrest, and opened drawers and moved aside items to find
evidence of the burglary. 18 The Court held that
[w]hen an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape. . . . In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person
in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. 19

The Court went on to state that “the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of
course, be governed by a like rule.” 20 Pursuant to these twin
rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation, officers were no
longer permitted to search the entire premises at which a person was
arrested—they were limited to searching the arrestee himself and the
area into which the arrestee might be able to reach.
In United States v. Robinson, the Court expanded the rule put
forth in Chimel, holding that officers may search closed containers
found on a person, or within his control, as a valid search incident
to arrest. 21 Officers arrested Robinson for driving with a revoked
license and proceeded to search his person. 22 The officer conducting
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 463–65 (1932) (invalidating a search of desk
drawers and a cabinet), and Trupiana v. United States, 334 U.S. 699,
705 (1948) (holding that officers must secure a search warrant whenever
practicable and failure to do so renders a search incident to arrest
invalid), with Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 152–53 (1947)
(permitting officers to search an entire four-room apartment including
desk drawers), and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60–63
(1950) (validating a search of the arrestee’s desk, safe, and file cabinets
since the area was within the possession of the arrestee).
15.

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

16.

Id. at 753.

17.

Id.

18.

Id. at 754.

19.

Id. at 762–63.

20.

Id. at 763.

21.

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).

22.

Id. at 220–22.
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the search felt an object in Robinson’s pocket but could not
determine what the object was, so he reached inside and pulled out
a cigarette package. 23 The officer testified that he was unsure what
was inside the package, but could ascertain that it was not
cigarettes, so he opened it to find fourteen capsules of heroin. 24 The
Court held that, “[h]aving in the course of a lawful search come
upon the crumpled package of cigarettes, he was entitled to inspect
it.” 25 The Court held that it was not necessary to litigate in every
case whether or not the officers were acting based on the theories of
officer safety or evidence preservation since searching incident to
arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 26
The Court’s holding in Robinson was subsequently used to
justify a warrantless search of a closed container in an automobile
incident to arrest. In New York v. Belton, police stopped a vehicle
for travelling at excessive speed and immediately smelled marijuana
and saw an envelope on the vehicle’s floor related to marijuana
use. 27 After arresting all four men in the vehicle, the officer searched
the vehicle. 28 The officer found a jacket on the back seat, belonging
to Belton, and proceeded to unzip the pockets, where he discovered
cocaine. 29 The Court held that police officers may search the
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest and
in doing so, officers may search any container found therein. 30 In a
footnote, the Court defined a ‘container’ as “any object capable of
holding another object . . . includ[ing] closed or open glove
compartments, consoles . . . luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the
like.” 31 According to the Court, it is not any reduced expectation of
privacy that authorizes this search, but instead the lawful arrest
justifies infringement on an arrestee’s privacy. 32

23.

Id. at 223.

24.

Id.

25.

Id. at 236.

26.

Id. at 235.

27.

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455–56 (1981).

28.

Id. at 456.

29.

Id.

30.

Id. at 460–61.

31.

Id. at 460–61 n.4.

32.

Id. at 461 (“Such a container may, of course, be searched whether it is
open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the
arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful
custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the
arrestee may have.”).
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II. Lower Courts’ Analyses of Warrantless Cell
Phone Searches
Lower courts have come to a variety of conclusions when dealing
with searches of cell phones incident to arrest. One of the most
prominent cases examining a search of a cell phone as a search
incident to arrest is United States v. Finley. 33 Police officers
conducted a valid traffic stop on the van Finley was driving after
observing an informant buy narcotics from a passenger in the
vehicle. 34 After searching the van and finding additional drug
paraphernalia, officers arrested both Finley and his passenger. 35 Upon
searching Finley’s person, officers found a cell phone, but did not
search it until they went to his passenger’s residence, where agents
were conducting a search pursuant to a prior warrant for the
residence. 36 Several text messages found on Finley’s phone implicated
him in narcotics trafficking, and after the police confronted Finley
with these messages, he admitted to distributing marijuana.37
Although the Fifth Circuit held that Finley had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his phone and its contents, the court upheld
the search. 38 In doing so, the court stated that “[p]olice officers are
not constrained to search only for weapons or instruments of escape
on the arrestee’s person; they may also, without any additional
justification, look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime on his person in
order to preserve it for use at trial.” 39 Since the cell phone was found
on Finley at the time of his arrest, the court upheld the search,
finding that the search was comparable to a search of a closed
container. 40 In December 2012, the Fifth Circuit declined to overrule
Finley in light of recent Supreme Court case law and instead upheld
the search of a suspect’s cell phone incident to his arrest for intent to

33.

United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).

34.

Id. at 253–54.

35.

Id. at 254.

36.

Id.

37.

Id. at 254–55.

38.

Id. at 259.

39.

Id. at 259–60.

40.

Id. at 260 (“The permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful
arrest extends to containers found on the arrestee’s person.” (citing

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223–24 (1973))).
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distribute and possess marijuana, again analogizing a cell phone to a
container. 41
A year after Finley, in United States v. Young, the Fourth Circuit
followed the Fifth Circuit’s lead and upheld the search of a suspect’s
cell phone incident to his lawful arrest on the theory of preserving
evidence. 42 Young’s girlfriend consented to a search of her apartment
after informing police of drug activities on its premises. 43 Two days
later, the police returned and arrested Young and an accomplice.44
Upon searching Young’s person, officers found a cell phone, searched
its text messages without a warrant, and wrote down the contents. 45
The court found that “officers had no way of knowing whether the
text messages would automatically delete themselves or be preserved,”
therefore permitting a search to occur incident to arrest. 46 In United
States v. Murphy, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed this holding and
rejected arguments that the storage capacity of a phone affects
whether police may search a phone incident to arrest. 47
But not all courts have followed the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit.
For instance, the Northern District of California disagreed with Finley,
and found a cell phone search to be impermissible as a search incident to
arrest. In United States v. Park, defendant Park was arrested after
officers observed other defendants leave items at an apartment that Park
and an accomplice then entered.48 Pursuant to a search warrant, the
officers entered the apartment and observed evidence of marijuana
cultivation. 49 After being transported to the police station, all defendants
were booked and their property, including their cell phones, was placed
into envelopes for safekeeping. 50 In an attempt to find fellow conspirators,
41.

United States v. Rodriguez, 702 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding
that Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), does not “disturb[ ]” the
Fifth Circuit’s holding in Finley).

42.

United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x 242, 245–46 (4th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (“[B]ased upon . . . the Fifth Circuit’s like conclusion, and the
manifest need of the officers to preserve evidence, we conclude that the
officers permissibly accessed and copied the text messages on the phone
during the search incident to arrest” (citing Finley, 477 F.3d at 259–
60)).

43.

Id. at 244.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46.

Id. at 245.

47.

United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009).

48.

United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. May 23, 2007).

49.

Id. at *1–2.

50.

Id. at *2.
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the officers searched the phones’ address books.51 The court concluded
that a modern cell phone is similar to a laptop computer rather than the
address books and pagers often found on a person incident to arrest, due
to the phone’s “capacity for storing immense amounts of private
information.” 52 Since the officers examined the phones long after the
initial arrest, the court found that the search of the cell phone was
beyond the rationales of ensuring police safety and preserving evidence
and was therefore purely investigatory. 53 The court held that officers
were lawfully permitted to seize the cell phones incident to arrest but
were required to obtain a warrant in order to search the phones’ contents
“due to the quantity and quality of information that can be stored on a
cellular phone.” 54
In State v. Smith, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed with Park’s
conclusion that when the search of a cell phone fails to further the
twin justifications of officer safety and preservation of evidence, the
evidence must be suppressed. 55 But it disagreed with Park’s rationale
that cell phones are similar to laptops, finding that modern cell
phones are still phones, and thus distinguishable from laptops.56
Smith’s arrest stemmed from the confession of a drug user who
claimed Smith was her dealer. 57 Upon his arrest, officers found and
searched Smith’s cell phone to examine the call records and phone
numbers to confirm the buyer’s story. 58 The court specifically held
that cell phones are not analogous to closed containers and an officer
must obtain a warrant, even when searching incident to arrest, prior
to searching a cell phone’s contents. 59
At least one court has reasoned that a search incident to arrest,
when based on the premise of preserving evidence, must arise from a
desire to preserve evidence of the specific crime for which the suspect

51.

Id. at *3–5. The record is unclear if the search was done prior to
booking or after, but it was clear that the search was done at the
station—over an hour after the arrest. Id.

52.

Id. at *8. The court continued to state that “a search of [a laptop is]
substantially more intrusive than a search of the contents of a lunchbox
or other tangible object.” Id. (quoting United States v. Arnold, 454 F.
Supp. 2d 999, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2006)).

53.

Id.

54.

Id. at *9.

55.

State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009).

56.

Id. at 955.

57.

Id. at 950.

58.

Id.

59.

Id. at 955.
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is being arrested. 60 In United States v. Quintana, police arrested
Quintana for driving with a suspended license. 61 While legally
searching the vehicle with Quintana’s consent, the officer smelled
marijuana but found no evidence of marijuana in the vehicle.62
Officers then searched Quintana’s phone in order to find evidence to
prove his marijuana use. 63 After finding a picture of a marijuana grow
house on the phone, officers proceeded to the address listed on
Quintana’s license, finding further evidence of marijuana cultivation. 64
The court stated that since the suspect was arrested for driving with
a suspended license the officer was not attempting to preserve
evidence of the crime and he was unjustified in his warrantless search
of the cell phone. 65 The court suppressed the photograph and further
evidence found at Quintana’s home. 66
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Flores-Lopez, upheld the
search of a cell phone when the search was conducted solely to find
the phone’s number as a valid search incident to arrest. 67 Flores-Lopez
was arrested after an informant overheard a conversation between
him and another dealer that methamphetamines would be delivered to
a garage at a particular time. 68 After the drugs arrived, officers
arrested Flores-Lopez and his associate and proceeded to search both
him and the vehicle in which Flores-Lopez had brought the drugs. 69
Officers found one cell phone on Flores-Lopez and two more in his
truck. 70 Subsequently, police officers searched each cell phone to find
its telephone number, which the officers then used to subpoena the
call history from the provider, including the phone call overheard by
the informant. 71 The court found that even a negligible risk that
evidence on the phone could be wiped validated searches of smart
phones, “provided it’s no more invasive than, say, a frisk, or the
60.

United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla.
2009).

61.

Id. at 1295.

62.

Id.

63.

Id. at 1295–96.

64.

Id. at 1296.

65.

Id. at 1300 (“This type of search is not justified by the twin rationales
of Chimel and pushes the search-incident-to arrest doctrine beyond its
limits.”).

66.

Id. at 1306.

67.

United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2012).

68.

Id. at 804.

69.

Id.

70.

Id.

71.

Id.
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search of a conventional container, such as Robinson’s cigarette pack,
in which heroin was found.” 72 Judge Posner, writing for the court,
declined to determine what level of risk would be required to justify a
more invasive search since those facts were not before the court. 73
As the above cases illustrate, lower courts cannot reach a
unanimous conclusion on how to treat cell phone searches incident to
arrest. Lower courts have variously permitted police officers to search
any cell phone incident to arrest, prohibited police officers from
searching any phone without a warrant, or applied a standard in
between. As such, police officers struggle to determine which phones
they may legally search under the Fourth Amendment. This
Comment posits that a workable standard based on Supreme Court
precedent already exists.

III. How Gant and Jones Affect Smart Phones
To date, the Supreme Court has never decided a case involving
the search of a smart phone, whether incident to arrest or otherwise.
In fact, the Court’s examination of developing technologies has been
limited to a few cases involving technologies such as wiretapping,
aerial photography, heat-sensing technology, and most recently a GPS
sensor. 74 The closest the Supreme Court has come to examining a
search of a smart phone was examining the legality of searching an
employee’s text messages through a city-owned pager. 75 The Supreme
Court decided that the search of the pager was valid on the
exceedingly narrow grounds that the special needs of the workplace
justified a warrantless search. 76 The Court expressly declined to
examine whether the defendant’s privacy expectations were implicated
by the search or whether any other exceptions to the warrant
requirement permitted the search. 77 But two of the Court’s recent
decisions—Arizona v. Gant 78 and United States v. Jones 79—may shed
72.

Id. at 809.

73.

Id. at 810.

74.

See Daniel T. Pesciotta, Note, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the
Fourth Amendment in the 21st Century, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 187
(2012) (examining Supreme Court cases involving both technology and
the Fourth Amendment and concluding that the Katz reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test is still relevant in today’s technologically
advanced society).

75.

City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).

76.

Id. at 2630.

77.

Id. at 2631.

78.

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).

79.

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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light upon what standard the Court would apply to searches of smart
phones incident to a lawful arrest.
A. Does Gant Affect Warrantless Searches Outside Vehicles?

In the 2009 decision Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court, per
Justice Stevens, held that officers may not search a suspect’s vehicle
incident to his arrest when the suspect is handcuffed and secured inside
a police car. 80 Officers arrested Gant for driving with a suspended
license and proceeded to handcuff and lock him in the back of the
police car. 81 Once Gant was secure, officers searched his vehicle and
discovered a bag of cocaine. 82 Gant opposed the introduction of the
cocaine as evidence at his trial, arguing that the search failed to meet
the original justifications for the search incident to arrest doctrine:
officer safety and evidence preservation. 83 The Court held that
[a] rule that gives police the power to conduct such a search
whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic offense,
when there is no basis for believing evidence of the offense
might be found in the vehicle, creates a serious and recurring
threat to the privacy of countless individuals. 84

Although the Court was speaking of the privacy interest owners
have in their vehicles, the same argument could be made for the
privacy interest in one’s cell phone. The Court’s statement in Gant
appears to apply to any situation in which officers attempt to conduct
a broad search of a suspect’s person and effects, despite his
expectation of privacy, simply because the suspect has been arrested.
Unanimously, each court to expressly examine the issue has found
that a suspect has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his phone
and its contents, 85 and the Supreme Court should agree and find an
80.

Gant, 556 U.S. at 351 (2009).

81.

Id. at 336.

82.

Id.

83.

Id.

84.

Id. at 345.

85.

See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007) (“In
these circumstances, we conclude that Finley had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the call records and text messages on the cell
phone.”); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M.D.
Fla. 2009) (“An owner of a cell phone generally has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the electronic data stored on the phone.”);
United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9 (N.D.
Cal. May 23, 2007) (“[D]ue to the quantity and quality of information
that can be stored on a cellular phone, a cellular phone should not be
characterized as an element of individual’s clothing or person, but rather
as a ‘possession[ ] within an arrestee’s immediate control [that has]
fourth amendment protection at the station house.’ ” (alteration in
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expectation of privacy to which Gant’s holding would apply.
Therefore, if the Supreme Court were to agree that there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a cell phone and its contents, it
would find that a rule permitting the search of any cell phone incident
to arrest would be a gross invasion of privacy, and thus
unconstitutional.
In Gant, the Court explicitly returned to the reasoning put forth
in Chimel, stating that searches incident to arrest are limited to the
area within the arrestee’s immediate control, meaning the area from
which he might obtain a weapon or destroy evidence. 86 But the Court
found that “circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a
search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found.’ ” 87 Although
this permission to search based on reasonable belief evidence will be
found does not stem from Chimel itself, the Court believed that the
lesser privacy interest in the vehicle permitted a search incident to
arrest to occur. Similarly, circumstances unique to smart phones
permit searches incident to arrest in limited circumstances. 88
B. Does Jones Affect Smart Phone Searches?

In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
traditional trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment. 89 The Court
was confronted with the issue of whether evidence must be suppressed
when officers placed a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s vehicle in
order to observe his movements over a four-week period. 90 Although
the government had initially obtained a warrant, the officers failed to
comply with its requirements, placing the device on the vehicle
outside the issuing court’s jurisdiction and outside the timeframe
permitted by the court. 91 The government conceded the failure to
comply and instead argued that no warrant was required in this

original) (quoting United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1290
(9th Cir. 1981))); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009)
(“[B]ecause an individual has a privacy interest in the contents of a cell
phone that goes beyond the privacy interest in an address book or
pager, an officer may not conduct a search of a cell phone’s contents
incident to a lawful arrest without first obtaining a warrant.”).
86.

Gant, 556 U.S. at 339.

87.

Id. at 343 (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (determining that a vehicle’s reduced expectation
of privacy permits a broader search incident to arrest)).

88.

See Part IV, infra.

89.

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).

90.

Id. at 948.

91.

Id.
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case. 92 The Court held that the government’s warrantless trespass
onto a citizen’s private property is considered a search. 93 Although
many recent cases focused solely on whether a suspect had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the item being searched, the
Court maintained that the trespass theory and reasonableexpectation-of-privacy theory are not mutually exclusive. 94 Since the
government “physically intrud[ed] on a constitutionally protected
area” the Court invalidated the search and ordered the evidence
suppressed. 95 Every court to address the issue of warrantless searches
of cell phones has found a search occurred, but the Jones opinion has
stirred debate as to whether officers can use a smart phone’s internal
GPS capabilities to track a suspect. 96
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor questioned if the
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test could continue to provide
guidance for courts in the wake of new technological advances.
Sotomayor stated that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.” 97 In the current
digital age, smart phone users disclose the numbers they call, the
websites they visit, and the people to whom they send e-mails to their
Internet service providers, 98 and even where they bank may be
shared. 99 Justice Sotomayor “would not assume that all information
92.

Id. at 948 n.1.

93.

Id. at 949 (“The Government physically occupied private property for
the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a
physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”).

94.

Id. at 952 (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been
added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”)
(emphasis in original); see also id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“[E]ven in the absence of a trespass, ‘a Fourth Amendment search
occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy
that society recognizes as reasonable.’ ” (quoting Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001))).

95.

Id. at 950 n.3 (majority opinion).

96.

See, e.g., Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth
Amendment and the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81
Fordham L. Rev. 489 (2012); Sara E. Silva, Oh, the Places You’ve
Been! Preserving Privacy in a Cellular Age, Bos. B.J., (Sept. 12, 2012),
http://bostonbarjournal.com/2012/09/12/oh-the-places-youve-beenpreserving-privacy-in-a-cellular-age/.

97.

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

98.

Id.

99.

See Shane Kite, The Five Best Mobile Banking Apps Now, Am. Banker
(October 1, 2010), http://www.americanbanker.com/btn/23_10/thefive-best-mobile-apps-now-1026278-1.html. Not only do people access
their bank on their cell phones, they can also pay for purchases and
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voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment
protection.” 100 Under this theory, individuals should not have less of
an expectation of privacy in their smart phones simply due to the
amount of information that is shared with the cell phone company or
other third parties.

IV. Warrantless Smart Phone Searches Are
Permissible in Limited Circumstances
Many commentators have spent countless pages arguing that
Chimel should not apply to the search of a cell phone, 101 and the
application of Gant to smart phone searches only clarifies that
warrantless searches may not be upheld as searches incident to arrest.
Gant illustrates the Court’s resolve to return to the initial rationales
behind the search incident to arrest doctrine. Jones, especially
Sotomayor’s concurrence, explains that without a warrant the
government cannot intrude into a constitutionally protected area, and
that the current era of technological advances mandates that smart
phone users be given Fourth Amendment protection consonant with
at least a minimum of an expectation of privacy.
accept credit card payments. See also Farnoosh Torabi, Mobile Banking:
6 Free Apps, CBS News (May 16, 2011, 7:49 AM), http://www.
cbsnews.com/8301-505144_162-41541902/mobile-banking-6-free-apps.
100. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Privacy is not a
discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who
disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business
purpose need not assume that this information will be released to other
persons for other purposes.” (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting))).
101. See, e.g., Charles E. MacLean, But, Your Honor, A Cell Phone is not a
Cigarette Pack: An Immodest Call for a Return to the Chimel
Justifications for Cell Phone Memory Searches Incident to Lawful
Arrest, 6 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 37, 38 (2012) (arguing that cell phones are
not like cigarette packs, pagers, wallets, or address books simply because
they are “likewise small, carried in pockets, and can contain personal
information”); see also Eunice Park, Traffic Ticket Reasonable, Cell
Phone Search Not: Applying the Search-Incident-to-Arrest Exception to
the Cell Phone as “Hybrid”, 60 Drake L. Rev. 429, 494 (2012) (“[L]aw
enforcement officers may search the contents of a cell phone seized
incident to a valid custodial arrest if the contents are reasonably likely
to yield evidence related to arrest, with a presumption that text
messages, e-mail logs, and call logs are searchable. Law enforcement
officers may search other reasonably related contents when an exigency
exists regarding safety.”). But see Adam M. Gershowitz, Password
Protected? Can a Password Save Your Cell Phone From a Search
Incident to Arrest?, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 1125, 1174 (2011) (arguing that
even a password-protected cell phone may be searched incident to arrest
without a warrant).
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A.

A Cell Phone Is Not a Container

New York v. Belton held that officers are permitted to search
containers found within an arrestee’s control. 102 And several courts
have specifically held that cell phones should be considered
containers, thereby permitting them to be searched incident to
arrest. 103 On the other hand, several courts have determined that cell
phones are not analogous to containers. 104 This is the better path—
due to the vast amounts of data contained in a phone, and the
phone’s inability to hold tangible items, courts should find that cell
phones are not analogous to ‘containers.’
As noted in State v. Smith, the Supreme Court specifically stated
in Belton that the definition of “container” includes only those objects
that may hold a physical object within it. 105 Additionally, the general
definition of containers does not encompass cell phones because a cell
phone is not “a receptacle . . . for holding goods.” 106 Cell phones are
generally small devices with no space to hold another physical object
inside. The containers contemplated by the Supreme Court included
such items as a cigarette pack in Robinson 107 and a jacket in Belton.108
A cigarette pack or jacket cannot compare with the sheer amount of
data found on today’s smart phones, including bank records and
personal documents that police would normally need a warrant to
access. Unless the Court expands its legal definition of containers,
lower courts should find that cell phones are not analogous to
containers.
Additionally, the Court permitted the search of Robinson’s
cigarette pack because the officer testified that he could not determine
the contents. 109 Police officers know, however, that smart phones

102. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007)
(defendant conceded that the cell phone was analogous to a container);
People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505 (Cal. 2011) (likening a cell phone to
Robinson’s cigarette package).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Park, No. CR 05–375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573,
at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007) (“[C]ellular phones should be considered
‘possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control’ and not part of ‘the
person’ ”.); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2009) (same).
105. Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954 (“ ‘Container’ here denotes any object capable
of holding another object.” (citing Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.4)).
106. Container, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/container (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
107. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
108. Belton, 453 U.S. at 454.
109. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 223.
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contain information that is not “intrinsically dangerous.” 110 Since
officers know the item likely poses no risk of harm, and the item is
not analogous to the Supreme Court’s “container,” officers should not
be permitted to search smart phones incident to arrest. This
Comment acknowledges that some commentators argue that the data
inside the cell phone is analogous to the physical objects held in
containers, since it is simply electronic information. 111 But this
Comment emphasizes the cases in which courts specifically held that
the vast amounts of data on a phone differentiate it from traditional
containers. 112 This Comment posits that Gant should control and
officers should only be permitted to search a smart phone when they
have reasonable suspicion that the smart phone contains evidence of
the crime of arrest.
B.

Smart Phones Deserve Privacy Equaling Computers

Commentators often compare smart phones to computers 113 and
the differences between the two are becoming fewer with each passing
year. Most courts addressing the issue have found that computers
have a heightened expectation of privacy and require police to obtain
a specific warrant for the computer prior to searching its contents.114
According to courts, “analogizing computers to other physical objects
when applying Fourth Amendment law is not an exact fit because
computers hold so much personal and sensitive information touching
on many private aspects of life.” 115
With each passing year “the line between cell phones and personal
computers has grown increasingly blurry.” 116 Today, both smart
phones and computers are exceedingly mobile devices. Consumers can
110. Ben E. Stewart, Note, Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest: A New
Standard Based on Arizona v. Gant, 99 Ky. L.J. 579, 592 (2011).
111. Byron Kish, Comment, Cellphone Searches: Works Like a Computer,
Protected Like a Pager?, 60 Cath. U. L. Rev. 445, 466–67 (2011).
112. E.g., United States v. Park, No. CR 05–375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8
(N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).
113. Park, supra note 101, at 478; Stewart, supra note 110, at 593; Bryan
Andrew Stillwagon, Bringing An End to Warrantless Cell Phone
Searches, 42 Ga. L. Rev. 1165, 1201 (2008).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001)
(holding that search warrants for computers must clearly define the
information being sought on the computer).
115. United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 178 (6th Cir. 2011); see also
United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Relying
on analogies to closed containers or file cabinets may lead courts to
oversimplify a complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore
the realities of massive modern computer storage.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
116. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8.
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purchase netbooks 117 or tablets, 118 which can fit into a purse or small
backpack and contain many of the same capabilities as laptop
computers. 119 Today, laptops can download programming “which
includes voice, video, and instant message capabilities” similar to that
used in cell phones. 120 Voice-Over-Internet Protocol was created to
replace telephone networks and permits computers to call other
computers, or even telephones. 121 Cloud computing software permits
users to access their data through the Internet no matter what
technology they are using. 122 With cloud computing software, a
consumer can carry every file from their computer with them on their
smart phone. Lastly, although courts seem willing to grant greater
protections to computers, a computer could be wiped just as a smart
phone may. 123 Since the differences between smart phones and
personal computers are becoming increasingly fewer, courts should
recognize that smart phones contain the same expectations of privacy
as computers and treat warrantless searches of smart phones in the
same manner. Therefore, courts should require reasonable suspicion in
the particular parts of the phone being searched.
C.

Limited Exigency Created by Remote Wiping

That a smart phone could be remotely deleted does create a
minor exigency, but not to the extent that every smart phone can be
117. Netbook, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/1498289/netbook (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
118. Tablet Computer, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/1740658/tablet-computer (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
119. The differences between a tablet computer and a smart phone are
continually diminishing, and soon there may be no difference at all. See,
e.g., Michael A. Prospero, Living (Really) Large, Laptop Magazine,
May 2012, at 44 (describing a cell phone, the Samsung Galaxy Note,
with the full capabilities of a tablet computer); Kevin C. Tofel, Asus
PadFone 2 is a Modular Phone and Tablet Combo, Gigaom (Oct. 16,
2012, 12:27 PM), http://gigaom.com/mobile/asus-padfone-2-is-a-modularphone-and-tablet-combo (describing a tablet powered by a cell phone).
120. Skype, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/1516582/Skype (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
121. Id.
122. Cloud Computing, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/1483678/cloud-computing (last visited Mar. 9, 2013);
see also Sara J. Kohls, Note, Searching the Clouds: Why Law
Enforcement Officials Need to Get Their Heads Out of the Cloud and
Obtain a Warrant Before Accessing a Cloud Network Account, 4 Case
W. Res. J.L. Tech. & Internet 169 (2012) (describing cloud
computing, why people use it, and whether service providers may access
those files).
123. Remote Delete Laptop Data for Enterprise, Druva, http://www.
druva.com/safepoint/remote-delete (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
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searched by officers. Although courts have found that the risk of
remote wiping permits searching cell phones incident to arrest, 124 the
data wiped may still be available for officers to find at a later date.
Thus, searching a cell phone incident to arrest is not be required.
Remote wiping “can reset a mobile phone to the factory default
condition.” 125 According to law enforcement, an arrestee’s accomplices
may be able to wipe the phone prior to officers obtaining a search
warrant. 126 “However, no data removal process leaves a mobile device
as free from residual data as when it’s new. Recovery of data from a
mobile device may still be possible using sophisticated tools.” 127
Although it may be expensive to obtain the sophisticated tools
necessary to access the removed data, such tools reduce the exigency
created by remote wiping technologies.
Alternatively, officers may prevent a remote wipe from occurring
by taking simple steps to protect the phone. For example, most
remote wipe technology requires the smart phone to be powered on
and officers could simply remove the battery from the device, or
power down the phone, as they await a warrant. 128 Additionally,
inexpensive devices called Faraday enclosures prevent the remote wipe
signal from reaching the phone. 129 Faraday enclosures shield their
124. See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2012)
(finding that it is “conceivable” for confederates to wipe data from a cell
phone before the government could obtain a search warrant); United
States v. Salgado, No. 1:09–CR–454–CAP–ECS–5, 2010 WL 3062440, at
*4 (N.D. Ga. June 12, 2010) (“At the time the cellular phone came into
[police] possession the data on the phone could have been altered, erased,
or deleted remotely.”); see also United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x 242,
245–46 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (finding that officers must search the
phone immediately because text messages can be deleted).
125. Remote Device Wipe, Microsoft Exchange Server, http://technet.
microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb124591.aspx (last modified Sept. 19,
2012); see also iPhone, Apple, http://www.apple.com/iphone/
built-in-apps/find-my-iphone.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2013) (explaining
that an iPhone owner can “initiate a remote wipe to delete [their]
personal data and restore [the phone] to its factory settings”).
126. Ben Grubb, Remote Wiping Thwarts Secret Service, ZDNet (May 18,
2010, 4:43 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/remote-wiping-thwarts-secretservice-1339303239; see also Park, supra note 101, at 493 (“As
consumers, and criminals in particular, become more skillful in their use
of smart phones, they will more frequently take advantage of the remote
wipe or automatic deletion feature to banish incriminating data from
their phones.”).
127. Remote Device Wipe, Microsoft Exchange Server, http://technet.
microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb124591.aspx (last modified Sept. 19, 2012).
128. See Grubb, supra note 126; see also Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 808
(“Without power a cell phone won’t be connected to the phone network
and so remote wiping will be impossible.”).
129. MacLean, supra note 101, at 50.
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contents from electromagnetic radiation and effectively prevent cell
phone signals from reaching a phone held inside, therefore eliminating
the risk of losing evidence. 130
In today’s digital age, the information stored on a smart phone is
often stored in multiple places, and wiping the phone would not
destroy the actual data sought by officers. 131 Smart phones include
contacts, calendars, email accounts, and more, 132 and such information
is often stored on servers and not solely on the phone. 133 If the officers
are unable to prevent the smart phone’s contents from being wiped,
they may seek a warrant to search the servers just as they may have
done for the phone itself. In fact, the Supreme Court has already held
that there is no expectation of privacy in the numbers called, 134 and
therefore officers could quickly subpoena the phone company
requesting the call logs from the phone.
Although remote wipe technology does create a risk that evidence
may be deleted, the data itself may still be accessible at a later time.
Since the data may still be accessible, courts should not find that
searches incident to arrest are required due to the risks posed in
waiting for a warrant.
D.

Setting a Standard

The standard set out in Gant for searches of motor vehicles
incident to arrest 135 should be applied to smart phones as well.
Consumers possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their phones
and, without an exception to the warrant requirement, any evidence
130. Id.
131. See Thomas Porter, The Fallacy of Remote Wiping, ZDNet (July 12,
2012, 1:55 PM, GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/the-fallacy-of-remotewiping-7000000611 (‘‘ ‘You nuked my entire device?’ That’s OK. I
replicated all of the important stuff to Facebook, several different cloud
storage providers and my home computer using Google +, Evernote,
Pocket, Delicious, Direct USB, etc.”).
132. William L. Hosch, Smartphone, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1498102/smartphone (last visited Mar. 9,
2013).
133. Cloud Computing, supra note 122. One example of such storage is
Apple’s cloud storage, “iCloud.” See also iCloud, Apple, http://
www.apple.com/icloud (last visited Mar. 9, 2013) (“iCloud does more
than store your content—it lets you access your music, photos, calendars,
contacts, documents, and more, from whatever device you’re on.”).
134. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
135. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (holding that “a vehicle
search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been
secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle” is not authorized,
but that “circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a
search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of
the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle”).
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seized must be suppressed. “While no particularized suspicion is
required for a search incident to arrest, there must be, at a minimum,
the possibility of destruction of evidence or a threat to an officer’s
safety.” 136 But due to the vast amounts of data found on smart
phones, officers should be required to limit their searches to those
areas of the phone that might contain relevant evidence. 137
At least one commentator has argued that officers are sometimes
searching for the telephone numbers of co-conspirators, which may
change prior to the officers being able to obtain a warrant. 138 In this
type of situation, however, Gant would permit a search of the phone’s
contacts since it is reasonable to assume that evidence would be found
on the phone. This Comment need not set a specific standard for this
type of exigency because the Gant standard would already permit a
valid search to occur.

Conclusion
Although courts have been left to analyze warrantless smart
phone searches incident to arrest without guidance from the Supreme
Court, recent cases clarify the standard that should be applied.
Following the Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant, 139 courts should
return to the twin justifications from Chimel v. California. 140 In order
to permit a search incident to arrest of a defendant’s smart phone,
police should determine if it was reasonable to believe evidence related
to the arrest would be found on the phone prior to the search.
Although officers will not be permitted to search smart phones
incident to every arrest, the specific circumstances surrounding an
arrest may implicate the reasonable belief necessary to permit a
search. In the hypothetical discussed in the Introduction to this
Comment, officers were not aware of any co-conspirators working
with White, so it would be unreasonable to search his phone and the
136. Stewart, supra note 110, at 593 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 763 (1969)).
137. This standard would be similar to that required in searches of
computers, even pursuant to a warrant. See United States v. Carey, 172
F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (requiring officers to sort the various
documents found on a computer and if the officer comes across
intermingled documents, the officer should request a new warrant
covering the new documents).
138. See Daniel K. Gelb, US v. Flores-Lopez: Does the Phone Booth Now
Reside Inside the Phone?, 36 Champion 18, 19 (May 2012) (explaining
that co-conspirators may replace their SIM cards each day, therefore
obtaining new phone numbers each time, which creates an exigency to
obtain phone numbers before they change).
139. Gant, 556 U.S. 332.
140. Chimel, 395 U.S. 752.
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evidence must be suppressed. Even if officers held a reasonable
suspicion that White’s phone contained contact information for his
co-conspirators, the search would be limited to the phone’s contact
list and recent calls—searching the phone’s photographs would be
impermissible.
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